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Abstract
The paper investigates the impact of EMU on foreign direct investment ﬂows. Using
the option value approach to investment decisions, it is possible to show how exchange rate
uncertainty hinders cross-border investment ﬂows. By permanently ﬁxing bilateral exchange
rates, a currency union can then be expected to spur international investment. Results
from a gravity model on a sample of OECD countries conﬁrm the hypothesis that currency
unions have a positive impact on FDI; moreover, adopting the same currency appears to do
more than merely eliminating exchange rate volatility. These ﬁndings closely resemble those
recently obtained in the trade literature.
JEL Codes: F15, F21.
1 Introduction
In the last few years, the completion of the European Monetary Union (EMU) with the intro-
duction of a single currency in 12 EU-member countries, has renewed the debate about Optimal
Currency Areas(OCA). Starting from Frankel and Rose (1998), who stress the static nature
of standard OCA criteria, two diﬀerent views are presently facing each other in the academic
arena. The ﬁrst can be traced to the specialization argument put forward by Krugman (1993)
and Krugman and Venables (1996): according to this paradigm closer economic integration (the
likely result of a single currency) will produce greater specialization and hence generate more
idiosyncratic shocks. Thus adopting a common currency should rise the costs of a uniﬁed mone-
tary policy. The competing view, on the contrary, postulates that business cycle correlations and
international trade linkages are not independent, but rather intertwined in a dynamic fashion,
whereby closer commercial links result in more correlated business cycles (Frankel and Rose,
1998). In a number of papers, Rose (2000, 2004, among others) and his co-authors (Glick and
Rose, 2002; Rose and Engel, 2000; Rose and van Wincoop, 2001) have devoted much eﬀort to
demonstrate a positive eﬀect of common currencies on trade. If established, this relation would
support the endogeneity argument through the link: single currency→more trade→closer output
correlation.
In the ﬁrst and probably most famous of his papers on this issue, Rose (2000) ﬁnds that
common currencies have an extremely large impact on international trade; there, in fact, he
claims that —ceteris paribus— countries with the same legal tender trade as much as 3 times
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1more than other economic systems. This conclusion has spurred a series of theoretical and
empirical papers by other authors1. Even without putting excessive trust in point estimates,
the bottom line of this stream of literature is that common currencies do have a signiﬁcant
positive eﬀect on international trade. This paper applies the same methodology employed by
Rose and many of his followers, namely a gravity-type empirical model, to estimate the eﬀects of
common currencies on FDI ﬂows. The rationale for this exercise goes beyond a simple extension
of the existing literature and is part of a broader research project aimed at investigating the
relevance of endogeneity argument from the point of view of ﬁnancial integration. In other
words, the issue to which this paper wishes to contribute is whether the introduction of the euro
is likely to bring about more integration of ﬁnancial markets and whether this can trigger the
cumulative processes that seem to work in the case of goods market. Cross-border investment
ﬂows constitute a natural starting point for this analysis since they possess attributes of both
ﬁnancial and commercial transactions. Moreover, as opposed to trade, theoretical literature
on investment decisions oﬀers a more solid explanation of the impact of currency unions on
international ﬂows. In fact, a strand of literature that emerged in the 1990s (Pindyck, 1991;
Dixit, 1992; Dixit and Pindyck, 1994) has shown that there exists an option value for delaying
investment decisions. This result is obtained by relaxing the assumptions —implicitly made
in standard neoclassic models— that investment opportunities last only one period and that
ﬁrm decisions are reversible. Despite the fact that under certain conditions the value of waiting
arises even in absence of uncertainty, irreversibility makes investment especially sensitive to
various forms of risk. Investment opportunities are associated with a perpetual American call
option whereby the ﬁrm holds the possibility to engage in an investment project at any point in
time. Then, by embarking on an investment the ﬁrm destroys this option and the consequent
opportunity cost must be taken into account when the ﬁrm evaluates the goodness of the project.
This is because irreversibility makes it impossible (or at least very costly) to liquidate the
investment in presence of negative outcomes and the more uncertain is the future, the more
valuable is the option to invest. Waiting, in fact, would allow the ﬁrm to collect more information
on which to base its decision. There are a number of reasons why real investment displays a
degree of irreversibility. Pindyck (1991) quotes the fact that the capital is ﬁrm or industry
speciﬁc or the classic lemons problem that makes secondary markets not eﬃcient. In the case
under scrutiny here, it seems reasonable to assume that international investments show an
even higher degree of irreversibility. A foreign investor that engages in an horizontal FDI, in
fact, is likely to have less knowledge of the foreign market, less access to local institutions and
business networks. This, coupled with potential diﬀerences in regulations, makes it more costly
for a multinational enterprise to quickly liquidate its investment and thus rises the degree of
irreversibility inherent to any FDI ﬂow.
The rest of the paper is organized as follow: section 2 introduces the relevant literature
and provides a brief overview of most signiﬁcant contributions. This is followed by a simple
model that exploits the option value approach to investment decisions to illustrate the eﬀects
of currency unions on cross-borders investment ﬂows. Then the empirical methodology and the
data are presented (section 4), while section 5 puts forward some predictions based on theoretical
arguments and previous results. Sections 6 summarizes the main results of the empirical analysis
while the last part (section 7) draws some conclusions.
2 Literature Review
As mentioned in the introduction, Rose (2000) has triggered a large quantity of work trying to
asses the impact of a single currency on international trade. There, in fact, the author ﬁnds that
common currencies have an extremely large impact on cross-border goods ﬂows. He claims that
1The interested reader may refer to Andy Rose’s web site http://faculty.haas.berkely.edu/arose/RecRes.htm#CUTrade
for a list of the most relevant attempts.
2countries with the same legal tender trade as much as 3 times more than other economic systems:
this conclusion has obviously spurred a series of theoretical and empirical papers by other authors
trying to explain, validate, shrink or reverse the result. Even though point estimates have to be
taken with some caution, the bottom line of this literature is that common currencies do have
a signiﬁcant positive eﬀect on international trade. Rose (2000) exploits a cross-country dataset
covering bilateral trade between 186 economic systems at ﬁve-year intervals. Only about 1% of
the observations involves currency union members and most of them tend to be small and/or
poor. The outcome of the paper —obtained using a linear gravity model— is even more diﬃcult
to interpret considering that exchange rate volatility plays no signiﬁcant role in the picture, both
in Rose’s analysis and in previous research2. Though the issue is a controversial one, so that it
is not possible to conclude that exchange rate volatility has not impact on international trade,
this inﬂuence is at best small and not particularly robust. As Rose (2004, p.3), himself quotes,
“Almost all the subsequent research in this area has been motivated by the belief that
currency unions cannot reasonably be expected to triple trade”.
Subsequent papers have put forward diﬀerent type of critiques concerning both the dataset
and the econometric techniques employed. In particular, the use of cross-sectional variation
does not address the relevant policy question (what happens to trade when a single currency
is introduced) since it concentrates on the diﬀerence in trade ﬂows between economies using
the same legal tender and those retaining monetary independence. A number of studies3 have
then used country-pair ﬁxed eﬀect with panel data in order to isolate the time-series variation.
As noted by Micco et al. (2003), this focus on the time-series dimension should mitigate the
problem of reverse causality that would rise if countries tend to form currency unions with
partners with which they trade a lot. Rose (2004) presents a meta-analysis of twenty-four
recent studies investigating the impact of currency unions on trade. While referring to this
paper for a concise yet rather complete review of the relevant literature, it is worth noting
the results of this meta-analysis that evaluates some 440 point estimates of the eﬀect under
discussion. Though the analyzed papers use diﬀerent data sets (some of which going back to
the gold standard era, some other including early evidence from EMU members) and exploit a
whole battery of econometric tools (from cross-sectional to time-series variation, from matching
techniques to country speciﬁc ﬁxed-eﬀects), almost all studies conﬁrm that currency unions
have a positive eﬀects on trade, especially large for small open economies sharing the currency
of a larger trading partner. A good number of the studies represents variations on the theme
of a gravity-type empirical model to which a dummy variable for common currency is added.
Though the gravity model has often been criticized for its lack of solid theoretical foundations4,
it has proven in the years a fairly accurate instrument for investigating the determinants of
trade ﬂows, and since the early works of Tinbergen (1962) and Linnemmann (1966) it has
become a standard tool in international economics. Moving from commercial ﬂows to FDI
may seem to preclude the use of a gravity model, and hence to impede the kind of analysis
performed by Rose, his followers and his competitors. On the contrary, a number of recent
studies has used the gravity speciﬁcation to explain FDI ﬂows and ﬁnancial transactions. With
even less theoretical backing than in the case of international trade ﬂows, these empirical works
has proven surprisingly (or maybe not, depending on the degree of personal trust on economic
2The impact of exchange rate volatility on international trade is a controversial topic. Among early attempts
to detect a systematic relationship, Hooper and Koohlhagen (1978) ﬁnd no signiﬁcant impact of nominal exchange
rate; Cushman (1983) uses the same methodology but gets conﬂicting results; Kenen and Rodrick (1986) ﬁnd a
negative impact of real exchange rate ﬂuctuations
3See Glick and Rose (2002), Micco et al. (2003), Pommerenke (2003).
4In truth, it is possible to derive the basic gravity model, i.e. an equation relating trade ﬂows to some measure
of economic “mass”, such as GDP and GDP per capita, and “distance”, from a theoretical model (see Anderson
(1979) and Deardorﬀ (1998)). However, the more complex gravity equations usually employed in empirical works,
which include a number of additional controls(common language, adjacency and the like) do not have explicit
theoretical foundations.
3modeling) accurate. In particular, the fact that portfolio investments decrease with distance
strikes as a sharp contrast with standard diversiﬁcation theory5. The wide body of literature
witnessing the presence of home bias in portfolio allocation points in the same direction and
furnishes a possible explanation to the apparent oddity of the result. Portes et al. (2001) and
Portes and Rey (1999, 2002) suggest that international capital markets are not frictionless at
all, but rather segmented by informational asymmetries that dominate them; hence distance
proxies for information costs and that is why it displays a signiﬁcant negative coeﬃcient in
the regressions. Indeed, additional variables representing more directly informational ﬂows are
also signiﬁcant but their inclusion reduces the eﬀect of distance and thus corroborates the
authors’ intuition. Loungani et al. (2002) and Mody et al. (2003) tackle the role of information
in driving FDI ﬂows more directly. In order to explain this “distance puzzle”6, both papers
develop an information-based model of international transactions that goes beyond the notion
of physical proximity and deﬁnes the concept of transactional distance. In particular, Mody
et al. (2003) ﬁnd that greater host-country transparency reduces FDI relative to trade ﬂows.
They explain this result with the fact that when information is more reliable and accessible,
the informational advantage of direct ownership is reduced and counterparts can rely on simpler
forms of international transaction such as trade. A similar conclusion is reached by Helpman et
al. (2004) who present a model populated by heterogeneous ﬁrms, some of which serve foreign
markets either via exporting or via FDI. The decision to use the former of the latter strategy
depends on the ﬁrm’s productivity and on the host country’s characteristics: higher transport
costs and higher country-speciﬁc ﬁxed costs reduce exports relative to FDI’s. Hence, lower
ﬁxed costs (and informational barriers may reasonably be included in this category) increase
exporters’ market share relative to multinational ﬁrms.
Moving from methodological to theoretical issues, the relation between investment and the
exchange rate has long been studied. Again, as in the case of trade, empirical results are
often contradictory and a clear cut result is no available. This paper draws from two streams of
empirical literature. The ﬁrst explicitly addresses the relation between exchange rates and FDI’s
starting from the standard neoclassic investment theory la Hartman (1972) and Abel (1983); the
second employs Dixit and Pindyck (1994) option value approach to asses the potential impact
of exchange rate ﬂuctuations (and misalignments) on investment decisions, although not much
work is directly related to FDI’s.
Reviewing the relevant empirical literature on the topic, Kiyota and Urata (2002) distinguish
between the studies that have tackled the relation between exchange rate levels and international
investment ﬂows and those focusing on exchange rate volatility. The former tend to ﬁnd a neg-
ative correlation, so that a depreciation of the domestic currency encourages FDI inﬂows. Froot
and Stein (1991) rationalize this using an imperfect ﬁnancial markets approach: in presence of
credit constraints personal wealth matters and thus exchange rate levels aﬀect relative wealth
position between domestic and foreign agents. Hence devaluations can lead to a surge of foreign
acquisitions. Klein and Rosengren (1994) ﬁnd strong evidence that relative wealth signiﬁcantly
aﬀects U.S. inward FDI’s. Similar ﬁndings are presented by Bayoumi and Lipworth (1998) and
Goldberg and Klein (1998). The common idea behind all these works is that a devaluation
of the host currency vis--vis the potential investor’s currency makes cross-border acquisition
cheaper and thus spurs international direct investment ﬂows7. While these studies provide a
univocal answer, works concentrating on the impact of exchange rate volatility oﬀer contra-
dictory results. Goldberg and Kolstad (1995), for instance, postulate a positive link based on
5The underlying assumption is that greater distance is associated with less business-cycle correlation and hence
grants more scope for diversiﬁcation.
6This label appears in Loungani et al. (2002)
7Expectations about long-term movements in the exchange rate do not enter the picture here, and this appears
as a major weakness of this strand of empirical analysis. Moreover, in general one would expect capital inﬂows
to be associated with expected future appreciation of the currency, which in turn should feed back into the
investment decision tempering the initial wealth eﬀect of devaluation.
4a non-negative correlation between export demand shocks and real exchange rate shocks that
spurs multinational enterprises to optimally choose to locate some productive capacity abroad.
Their evidence is supportive of this hypothesis. On the contrary, Benassy-Quere et al. (1999)
and Kiyota and Urata (2002) ﬁnd that volatility is detrimental to foreign direct investments8.
Aizenman (1992) presents a model that can help to explain this variability in empirical re-
sults. In his paper, in fact, under a ﬂexible exchange rate regime the sign of the correlation
between investment and exchange rate variability depends on the nature of the shocks: negative
when nominal shocks dominates, it turns positive in presence of real shocks9. The discussion
about the role of exchange rate volatility leads naturally to an examination of the literature
that analyses investment decision using the option-value approach. Combining uncertainty with
irreversibility, two features inherent to almost all investment decisions, this approach reaches
the intuitive conclusion that greater uncertainty reduces investments by increasing the value of
waiting. This is in contrast with the earlier conclusion of Hartman (1972) and Abel (1983), who
ﬁnd that increased uncertainty may rise investment because it has a positive eﬀect on the value
of a marginal unit of capital10. Carruth et al. (2000) oﬀer an interesting survey of empirical
literature stimulated by Dixit and Pindyck’s inﬂuential work. An important point made in the
article is that option-based models do not oﬀer a theory of investment, but rather identiﬁes a set
of factors that may inﬂuence the threshold point at which investment is triggered. Translating
theory into empirical work presents some diﬃculties, the ﬁrst of which is whether the relation
between investment and uncertainty found at ﬁrm level will also hold at aggregate level, or if
the researcher will have to rely only on microdata. Bernanke (1983) and Bertola and Caballero
(1994) argue that microeconomic irreversibility —together with idiosyncratic uncertainty— is
relevant also for aggregate behavior. Hence they eliminate the potential risk of idiosyncratic
shock canceling out at industry- or economy-wide level. Aggregate empirical studies that as-
sociate investment and some measure of uncertainty ﬁnd a negative correlation between the
two variables. This relation is robust to diﬀerent model speciﬁcation and diﬀerent proxies for
uncertainty11. In particular, Calcagnini and Saltari (2000) consider demand and interest rate
uncertainty and show theoretically that, in presence of irreversibility, they both reduce demand
for capital goods. Empirical analysis using aggregate data on the Italian economy conﬁrms the
importance of demand uncertainty, while ﬁnds no signiﬁcant role for interest rate uncertainty.
On a more disaggregated level, Guiso and Parigi (1999) ﬁnd that uncertainty does weaken the
response of investment to perceived demand conditions12, but that there is considerable het-
erogeneity in the eﬀect. In addition, they show that this negative impact cannot be explained
by uncertainty proxying for liquidity constraints Shifting the focus on studies that investigate
the impact of exchange rate uncertainty, Goldberg (1993) performs both aggregate and 2-digit
industrial analysis but ﬁnds only weak evidence of a negative impact. Using a 4-digit panel of
FDI’s Campa (1993) ﬁnds exchange-rate volatility to be negatively correlated with cross-border
investment inﬂows, especially in industries characterized by high sunk costs. Darby et al. (1999,
2000) show theoretically that increased exchange rate uncertainty can have opposite eﬀects on
investment decision depending on model parameters, so that exact determination of the rela-
tion remains an empirical matter. They ﬁnd evidence of a negative correlation, which however
is neither particularly strong nor independent of the industrial structure; moreover, volatility
seems not to be more important than misalignments which, particularly when persistent, have
8While Kiyota and Urata (2002) conﬁrm the negative relation between exchange rate levels and FDI’s, Benassy-
Quere et al. (1999) ﬁnd a positive correlation in oil exporting countries and explain this as the symptom of a
“Dutch didease”.
9The same model predicts that ﬁxed exchange rates are more conducive to FDI’s relative to a ﬂexible regime.
10If the marginal product of capital is a convex function of the random variable, greater uncertainty implies
a higher expected marginal product and hence increases investment. This result is an implication of Jensen’s
inequality: if f(x) is a convex function of x, then E[f(x)] > f(E[x]).
11See Carruth et al. (2000, Table 1).
12The authors use information on the subjective probability distribution.
5a relevant impact. Byrne and Davis (2002) ﬁnd that “exchange rate uncertainty as measured by
conditional volatility from GARCH estimates, is harmful to investment”13. This brings to the
stage the question of how to model uncertainty. Carruth et al. (2000) survey a range of diﬀerent
volatility speciﬁcation and suggest that results are scarcely aﬀected by the particular choice of
the researcher. A potential critique of the GARCH approach comes from Darby et al. (1999)
who note how quarterly exchange rate data appear too low a frequency for such an approach,
usually applied to high frequency ﬁnancial data.
3 A Simple Model
Calcagnini and Saltari (2000) present a continuous-time model that analyzes the impact of
demand and interest rate uncertainty on investment decisions. These are exactly the channels
through which the introduction of the single currency in Europe is supposed to aﬀect FDI’s.
First, exchange rate stability reduces demand uncertainty because prices no longer depend on the
exchange rate; second, the convergence required by the Maastricht Treaty and by the Stability
and Growth Pact should grant lower and more stable real interest rates. Following Pindyck
(1991) and Dixit (1992) this section illustrates the eﬀects of currency unions on investment
behavior by means of a very simple model where uncertainty is introduced through exchange
rate ﬂuctuations. Consider a ﬁrm that at time has the opportunity to engage in FDI activity
at a cost F. This investment will grant a perpetual production of 1 unit of good to be sold in
the foreign market (horizontal FDI) at the price p∗. Abstracting, for the sake of simplicity, from
production costs, the revenue to the multinational (in domestic currency) would then be
πt = pt · 1 = p∗
t · st = p∗ · st (1)
where st is the exchange rate14. Note that here there is no demand uncertainty in that the
price at which the good is sold in the foreign market is assumed ﬁxed. Now, suppose that the
exchange rate follows a geometric Brownian motion of the form:
ds =  sdt + σsdz. (2)
This process ﬁnds widespread application in economics since it provides a good approxima-
tion of the dynamics of exchange rates and numerous other asset prices15 . By setting the model
will assume that there is no trend in the exchange rate movement, so that for any short period
dt the expected change in the exchange rate (ds) equals zero. This setting is consistent with
the random walk hypothesis for exchange rate movements, which is supported by the data16.
Hence,
E[s + ds] = s.
The goal of the ﬁrm is maximizing the (expected) value of the investment opportunity (which
is equivalent to the expected present value of its cash-ﬂow):
V (s) = maxEt
￿
(πT(s) − F)e−ρT￿
where T is the future time when the investment is made and ρ the discount rate. The Bellman
equation for this problem is
ρV (s)dt = Et [dV (s)]; (3)
equation (3) states that the return from the investment project —the capital gain accruing from
the change in its value— must equal the normal return ρV (s)dt. Using Ito’s Lemma to expand
13Byrne and Davis (2002, p. 31).
14Price of the foreign currency in terms of domestic currency units.
15See Dixit (1993, pp.6–7).
16See Meese and Rogoﬀ (1983) for a classic contribution on the forecasting ability of several structural models
of exchange rate determination versus a simple random walk.
6the right hand side and exploiting both the smooth pasting and the value matching boundary
conditions it is possible to get a closed form solution for the threshold value of the revenue17.
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constant (see equation (1)), hence the volatility of proﬁts is proportional to the volatility of the















￿2 > 0 (5)
hence an increase in exchange rate volatility rises the level of return required by the ﬁrm to
engage in the investment project.
After the inception of a currency union, the problem presents a trivial solution: exchange
rate volatility would in fact drop to zero. By setting σ = 0, proﬁts are constant and the
optimal choice is to invest immediately if , otherwise never invest. In this case the threshold
level is F which is lower than π∗. As a consequence, the elimination of exchange rate volatility
caused by the introduction of the euro can potentially facilitate FDI ﬂows by reducing the level
of proﬁt required by the ﬁrms before engaging in FDI. Does this mean that currency unions
increase the level of FDI’s? The link between the timing of investment and its actual level
is a delicate topic: Carruth et al. (2000) correctly point out that the irreversible investment
literature does not describe the level of investment, but rather insists on those factor that may
aﬀect the threshold level at which investment is undertaken. Still, it appears that at every
point in time, the number of investment projects actually launched will be lower in presence
of uncertainty. This is because the ex ante required return is greater: i.e. there exists a range
of values of p (F < π < π∗) for which an investment that would be commenced in a world
characterized by certainty, is postponed in a stochastic environment. The size of the wedge
between the two threshold levels depends crucially on the volatility of the exchange rate s2. The
higher the volatility, the larger the wedge and, consequently, the higher the probability that an
investment opportunity is deferred. Hence the model suggests that the elimination of exchange
rate volatility gives a “nonnegative” impulse to cross-border investment. In what follows the
paper focuses on the EMU in order to present empirical support for this link between exchange
rate volatility and FDI ﬂows.
4 Methodology and Data
The present study estimates a log-linear gravity model with a parsimonious set of explanatory
variables. In truth, this is more a necessity that a choice: given the aim of the paper —
establishing the impact of currency unions on international investment ﬂows— there is the need
to identify the origin and the destination of FDI’s; yet gravity models have proven very accurate
in explaining bilateral ﬂows using a limited amount of information. Following Glick and Rose
(2002), Micco et al. (2003) and Pommerenke (2003), all time-invariant control variables are
17This simple model follows closely Pindyck (1991) and Dixit (1992). These are the references for the exact
derivation of the solution.
7subsumed in country-pair ﬁxed eﬀects. Using ﬁxed eﬀects allows one to isolate the time-series
variation and hence reduces the concerns about endogeneity or reverse-causation. As noted
by Micco et al. (2003), in fact, country-pairs dummies separate all “normal” factors that do
not change over time and that may inﬂuence international transactions. Examples of such
variables are easily found in standard empirical literature and range from common borders to
common language, from the number of landlocked countries in the pair, to the presence of a
common colonizer. The country-pair ﬁxed eﬀects formulation eliminates biases due to missing
time-invariant control variables and grants a clearer outcome since the coeﬃcient of these ﬁxed
eﬀects are not of interest in this study. Moreover, as underlined by Glick and Rose (2002) and
Micco et al. (2003), by focusing on the time-series dimension one answers the “right” policy
question: what happens when a country joins or leaves a currency union?18 The theoretical
discussion of the previous paragraphs have been intentionally simpliﬁed and has not produced
a precise model to be tested empirically. Rather, it has supplied a better understating of the
factors that are likely to shape international investments ﬂows and, in particular, the channels
through which the introduction of a single currency can inﬂuence FDI’s. The baseline regression
equation is
lnFDIijt = αij + β0 lnGDPit + β1 lnGDPjt + β2 lnPOPit+
+ β3 lnPOPjt + γCUijt + Y RDt + ǫijt (6)
where i and j denote countries, t denotes time and other notation is deﬁned as follows:
• αij represents country-pair ﬁxed eﬀects;
• FDIijt is the investment ﬂow between countries i and j at time t;
• GDPit is GDP of country i at time t;
• POPit is total population of country i at time t;
• CUijt is a dummy variable that equals 1 if countries i and j use the same currency at time
t and 0 otherwise;
• Y RDt is a set of dummy variables that control for year-speciﬁc eﬀects19.
Equation (6) presents a stylized gravity model explaining international investment ﬂows by
means of two “mass” variable, GDP and population, a set of country-pair ﬁxed eﬀects that sub-
sume time invariant controls such as distance, land area, common language and other traditional
gravity variables20. The equation has been augmented with a dummy for currency union along
the line of Rose (2000). This baseline model will be modiﬁed to accommodate what economic
theory and economic intuition suggest. In particular, according to the empirical literature re-
viewed in the previous section, one may interpret a positive coeﬃcient for the currency union
dummy as a mere re-statement that exchange rate volatility has an adverse impact on FDI’s.
On the contrary, Rose (2000) confutes this interpretation in the case of trade ﬂows showing that
while exchange rate volatility does not enter signiﬁcantly into the regression, the single currency
dummy is positive and signiﬁcant. Inserting in (6) a measure of exchange rate uncertainty may
thus allow the researcher to see whether CUijt is just capturing the eﬀect of volatility or not.
Darby et al. (2000) point out that the separation between short-run volatility and misalignment
18It is true, however, that using country-pair ﬁxed eﬀects one looses a lot of gravity intuition because the most
immediate controls, namely land area and distance, do not appear in the regression.
19The ﬁrst year is excluded to avoid colinearity.
20This formulation departs a little from the equations used in the literature quoted so far. In particular Micco
et al. (2003) use both total and per capita GDP whilst excluding population; Loungani et al. (2002) and Mody
et al. (2003) include population but not total GDP. Equation (6) above minimizes potential colinearity problems,
while feeding the same amount of information to the model.
8eﬀects is relevant because overlooking this diﬀerence may result in misspeciﬁcation. Carruth
et al. (2000) survey a number of diﬀerent speciﬁcations used in the literature and come to the
conclusion that the particular measure chosen makes little diﬀerence. The paper then opts for
the 3-years (12 quarters) coeﬃcient of variation of bilateral real exchange rate computed using
quarterly data21 as a measure of short-term volatility. Another measure, proposed in Kenen and
Rodrick (1986), will be used as a robustness check22. To capture misalignments, Bleaney (1992)
suggests using the standard deviation of the level of the real exchange rate over a long enough
time-span. To correct for the potential bias arising from pooling together exchange rates with
diﬀerent means, the coeﬃcient of variation is substituted for the standard deviation; this time
however the time-span is 10 years (40 quarter). Hence two diﬀerent indicators of real exchange
rate volatility are introduced, a short-term indicator aimed at capturing pure volatility (RERVt)
and a long-term index meant to measure misalignments (MISt)23. The new estimating equation
then becomes
lnFDIijt = αij + β0 lnGDPit + β1 lnGDPjt + β2 lnPOPit+
+ β3 lnPOPjt + γCUijt + δ1REEVijt + δ2MISijt + Y RDt + ǫijt (7)
In a recent review of theoretical and empirical works on international investment ﬂows,
Markusen and Maskus (2001) conclude that most FDI’s are of the horizontal type and occur
between similar countries24. This is consistent with Brainard (1997) who shows how over-
seas production by multinationals increases relative to exports the higher transport costs and
trade barriers. Then it is possible to imagine that the EMU area will attract more non-EMU
investments after the introduction of the euro, since a single currency allows for a complete
penetration of multinational corporations into the whole European market25. Hence another
indicator (EMU1ijt) is added to equation (7): this variable takes value of 1 when at time t only
one of the two countries involved in the FDI activity is member of EMU and is equal to zero
otherwise.
lnFDIijt = αij + β0 lnGDPit + β1 lnGDPjt + β2 lnPOPit + β3 lnPOPjt+
+ γCUijt + δ1REEVijt + δ2MISijt + φEMU1ijt + Y RDt + ǫijt (8)
This is yet another indirect test of deep integration26, i.e. the idea that sharing the same
legal tender not only eliminates exchange rate volatility, but rather constitutes a reduction of
the transactional and informational barriers that evidently plays a major role in shaping inter-
national investment decisions. This hypothesis supports the belief that the eﬀect of a currency
union goes beyond the mere elimination of exchange rate risk and exchange rate volatility and
is thus consistent with Rose (2000). Micco et al. (2003) use the same variable to test for trade
diversion, i.e. the possibility that the increase in trade among EMU members comes at the
expenses of a deterioration of commercial links with nonmember countries. The same reasoning
applies here with respect to investments.













where e is the quarter bilateral real exchange rate between countries i and j.
23Each volatility index is set equal to zero when CU = 1.
24While vertical FDI’s are aimed at exploiting more favorable conditions in the productive process (the simples
example is lower wage rates), horizontal ones are usually driven by the desire to be close to customers in important
and large markets and by the will to enter new markets circumventing obstacles to trade (tariﬀs, transport costs,
and the like).
25The idea is that a single currency would boost trade along the line of Rose (2000). If this is true, then locating
in one member country will grant access to the market of all other participants to the currency union. This in
turn increases the extent of the market served by the foreign aﬃliate and make FDI potentially more proﬁtable.
26This label is borrowed from Hoekman and Konan (1999), though they use it in a slightly diﬀerent way
9The structure of the paper grants also the possibility to test the model presented by Mody
et al. (2003). There, they postulate a negative link between host country transparency and
international investment decisions on the ground that transparency makes the informational
advantage of direct ownership less pronounced, so that there is less need to rely on it. Hence
diﬀerent forms of international transaction (trade) are used. The underlying assumption is
that FDI substitutes for commercial linkages when the latter are more costly that the former.
This interesting conclusion is similar to the argument put forward by Coase (1937) to justify
the boundary of the ﬁrm: when transaction costs (i.e. the costs related to the functioning of
the market mechanisms) grow beyond a threshold, it is more convenient to internalize relevant
transactions by means of an organization. Rose (2000) received so much attention because
joining a currency union was until then considered, at least in the empirical literature, equivalent
to the permanent ﬁxing of exchange rate. But exchange rate volatility has little impact on
trade ﬂows (Rose, 2000) and on portfolio allocation (see Portes and Rey (2002) on cross-border
equity transactions). Hence the surprising large eﬀect estimated by Rose (2000) tells that a
single currency represents something more than the mere reduction of exchange rate volatility.
Drawing from Portes and Rey (2002) and Portes et al. (2001) one can take one further step
and conclude that a single currency must have something to do with informational barriers. If
this is the case, then it is straightforward to assume that currency union will as well increase







= αij + β0 lnGDPit + β1 lnGDPjt + β2 lnPOPit + β3 lnPOPjt+
+ γCUijt + δ1REEVijt + δ2MISijt + φEMU1ijt + Y RDt + ǫijt (9)
where Tradeijt is a measure of trade ﬂows that take the same route as the direct investment27.
Data on annual FDI ﬂows are taken from the International Direct Investment Database
of OECD28 and cover 25 countries29. The dataset consists of 300 country-pairs whose data
are recorded for 22 years (1980–2001), resulting in a panel of 6600 potential observations. A
considerable number of missing values reduces the observations actually available. A problem
peculiar to FDI’s is their high degree of variability year by year. Since FDI ﬂows are characterized
by large investment projects by multinational corporations that are likely to involve massive
monetary outﬂows in the initial years, reported FDI series present a rather erratic behavior.
Even though this may save the researcher from the potential trouble of nonstationariety, too
much noise can easily be counterproductive. Loungani et al. (2002) and Mody et al. (2003)
tackle this problem by taking three-year averages of investment ﬂows, but this leaves them
with a very short time-series dimension. This approach is not applicable in the present study
for three reasons. First, as already mentioned, the focus here is on the time-series variation
of FDI’s, so drastically reducing the available time periods would go against the spirit of the
analysis. Second, reducing the time series dimension would cut the number of observations for
which CUijt = 1 and hence severely limit the explanatory power of the analysis, aimed exactly
at unveiling the eﬀect of currency unions. Third, averaging would result in mixing together
years for which the currency union dummy equals 1 and years for which it is 0, making any
inference not only obscure but rather unreliable. Another potential path to reduce the noise is
to apply some sort of ﬁltering procedure to the series. Yet, another bunch of technical problems
would arise in this case. Filtering techniques, in fact, are tailored for macroeconomic time-series
involving long time spans and are not particularly suited for short panels. Moreover, they may
27In the case of inﬂows from country j to country i, Tradeijt represents imports in country i from country j.
28http://www.OECDsource.org .
29The countries are Australia, Austria, Belgium and Luxembourg (considered as a single economic unit),
Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Mex-
ico, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, US.
10produce unpleasant distortions at the beginning and at the end of the series. Despite the fact
that such distortions can be taken care of by creating some out-of-sample extra observations,
the short length of the time span and the relative signiﬁcant presence of missing observations
suggest that the risk is not worth taking, especially because in the last years are concentrated
all the cases where CUijt = 1.
To correct at least partially for the high degree of volatility that characterizes FDI data,
only countries that appear both as reporting and as partner countries have been selected. In
this way, in fact, it is possible to match diﬀerent measures of the same ﬂow and thus dispose at
least of some noise. Thus inﬂows reported by country A as originated in country B have been
matched with outﬂows reported by country B as directed to country A30; despite representing
the same phenomenon, the two magnitudes are never equal. Averaging among the two values
one then obtains one measure of inﬂows to A from B31. In addition, a set of year ﬁxed eﬀects
has been added to the gravity equation with the aim of getting rid —at least— of the noise
generated by year-speciﬁc events common to most countries32.
Figures are expressed in millions of local currency units of the reporting country (save for
some exceptions, where ﬂows are reported in millions of US dollars) so they have been converted
in US$ using exchange rates data taken by the IMF’s International Financial Statistics (IFS)
CD-Rom (series RF.ZF, period average). The same series, together with data on CPI’s (series
64ZF), are used to obtain the bilateral real exchange rates needed to compute the volatility
indexes33 34.
Population and GDP data are taken from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators
2003 CD-Rom. Population corresponds to Total Population (series SP.POP.TOTL), while GDP
is taken at current US$ (series NY.GDP.MKTP.CD). Real ﬁgures are obtained using national
GDP deﬂators (NY.GDP.DEFL.ZS) in the case of GDP data; the US deﬂator is instead used
for all FDI ﬂows since it is diﬃcult to asses which country’s cost of living is more relevant35.
Trade data are obtained from IMF’s Direction of Trade Statistics (DOT) CD-Rom. Com-
mercial ﬂows are already expressed in US dollars, so there is no need to operate any conversion.
The only currency union present in the sample is the EMU in the last three years of the period,
so the CU dummy is easily built36.
The presence of numerous cases in which the reported FDI ﬂow is zero or negative poses a
serious econometric problem. The log-linear structure of the gravity model implies the impos-
sibility of exploiting observations for which the natural logarithm does not exist. In order to
exploit the maximum amount of available information, data have been modiﬁed in a way that
makes possible to use a Tobit model (a censored regression that assumes a normal distribution).
In particular, calling investmentijt the variable reporting the investment ﬂow occurring at time
30According to the so called directional principle recommended by the IMF, each country reports transactions
with foreign aﬃliates as outward FDI ﬂows, while the controlled enterprise’s country registers the same operations
as inﬂows. For a survey on FDI statistics, see Falzoni (2000).
31Empirical work on the original series appears to be dominated by noise. Rose (2000) applies the same “trick of
the trade” to his trade data. It is true. however, that trade statistics display a superior degree of standardization
than FDI data, so that this operation has a smaller impact than in the present case.
32Year ﬁxed eﬀects are also likely to incorporate at least part of the “euro eﬀect” thus leading to potential
underestimation of the CU parameter.
33The only diﬀerence lies in the fact the volatility measures are obtained using quarterly data.
34Bilateral exchange rates with the dollar for EMU member are obtained from the product of the $/e ex-
change rate and the irreversibly pegged conversion rate of member countries’ currency with the e (published at
www.ecb.int).
35A robustness check performed using US GDP deﬂator instead of national deﬂators shows that this choice
plays no relevant role in the empirical ﬁndings. These results are not presented but are available upon request.
36This short time-span may severely limit the ability of the paper to address the longer-term impact of currency
unions on FDI ﬂows; nonetheless the number of occurrences in which CUijt = 1 represents a share of the sample
ranging between 2.5% and 4%, in line with the 1% presented by Rose (2000).
11t between country i and country j37, the following transformation has been applied:
flowijt :=
(
0 if investmentijt ≤ 0
investmentijt if investmentijt > 0
;
FDIijt :=1 + flowijt.
The variable used in the regression analysis is then lnFDIijt, which displays a left censoring
limit at zero.
5 Predictions
The ﬁrst and foremost expectation from empirical analysis is a positive and robust coeﬃcient
for CUijt in equation (6), suggesting that currency unions do have a positive impact on FDI’s.
In equation (7) the exchange rate volatility indexes should have a negative sign, suggesting
that an increase in exchange rate uncertainty hinders cross-border investment ﬂows. If the
CUijt coeﬃcient is still positive and signiﬁcant then one could conclude that, as in the case of
trade, a currency union not only eliminates exchange rate ﬂuctuations, but also eliminates some
of the informational barriers that play an important role in shaping international investment
decisions38. Equation (8) provides yet another test of this deep integration hypothesis by means
of the inclusion of the EMU1ijt indicator. A positive marginal eﬀect on this variable conﬁrms
the idea that once the single currency is in place, non-European multinational corporations may
ﬁnd investing in the euro area more favorable than before because the single currency provides
more direct access to the wider market represented by the aggregation of national markets of
all participating countries. Additionally, it is possible to incorporate one of the predictions
emerging from the model presented by Mody et al. (2003). There they postulate a negative link
between host country transparency and international investment decisions on the ground that
transparency renders the informational advantage of direct ownership less pronounced. Hence,
agents should substitute away from direct ownership into trade relations. If currency unions
contribute to increase transparency, then the model developed in Mody et al. (2003) predicts
that they will have a negative impact on FDI’s relative to trade: hence in equation (9) γ should
be negative. Table 1 summarizes the predictions on the key coeﬃcients contained in each of the
four estimating equations.
6 Empirical Results
The number of nonmissing country-pair observations in which countries are joined by the use
of the same currency is 133. This implies that currency union members represents about the
2.8% of nonmissing observations, compared to the 1% quoted by Rose (2000) for his dataset.
A note of warning —worth making explicit— is that the formulation chosen for the gravity
equation is in no way exhaustive. The paper is not trying to explain FDI ﬂows just as a function
of GDP’s, populations, some time-invariant ﬁxed eﬀects and a dummy variable for common
currencies. Rather, it is using previous results that have shown how few simple “gravity-type”
variables can predict reasonably well cross-border investment decisions, to explore the eﬀect
of an additional regressor (the currency union dummy). Thus the attention is focused on the
signiﬁcance of this latter variable rather than on the overall explanatory power of the model,
which is by construction quite rough.
Table 2 presents a plain-vanilla OLS model with year dummies and country-pair ﬁxed eﬀects.
Following Micco et al. (2003), the analysis is performed using both nominal and real controls
37This variable is the result of the averaging procedure described above.
38See Portes and Rey (1999, 2002), Portes et al. (2001), Loungani et al. (2002), Mody et al. (2003).
12in order to limit the potential bias due to exchange rate movements39. Given the substantial
depreciation undergone by the euro between 1999 and 2001, and the relative importance of EMU
members in the dataset, the two estimates should provide one with some sort of “conﬁdence
interval”. Columns (1) to (3) reports the outcome from the regression of real FDI inﬂows on
nominal GDP ﬁgures, while results displayed in columns (4) to (6) are obtained using real GDP.
The ﬁrst point to note, is that the use of nominal versus real controls does not change the
qualitative result: both the sign and the magnitude of estimated coeﬃcients remain roughly the
same. The currency union dummy, short-term volatility (CV 3t) and EMU1ijt display signiﬁcant
coeﬃcients and, above all, the expected sign. CV 10t, which measures, misalignments, is not
signiﬁcant, but still shows the expected negative sign. The value of the CUijt coeﬃcient suggests
that currency unions generate an increase in cross-border investment ﬂows of the order of 110-
230%. The OLS model implies the loss of all information contained in observations for which FDI
are negative (implying a disinvestment); by applying a Tobit model, on the contrary, it is possible
to partly exploit this additional information. Attention has to be paid not to confuse estimated
coeﬃcients with marginal eﬀects. In these kind of models, in fact, the two are not the same, and
they will be reported separately in the paper. Tables 3 and 4 present relevant results for the
Tobit speciﬁcation: again both nominal (Table 3) and real regressors (4) are used. Column (1)
reports estimated coeﬃcients for equation 6, in columns (2) and (3) only short-term volatility
is taken into account, while the last two columns show results for equations 7 and 8. Countries
characteristics are not signiﬁcant in all speciﬁcation: in particular, country2 (the source country)
population seems not to give a valuable contribution. This suggests that host-country features
are more important in that they signal the potential proﬁtability of the investment. More
importantly, however, the currency union dummy and the exchange rate volatility index display
the expected sign and are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero, though misalignments appear to
have larger impact. This is consistent with a world of irreversible investments in which long-
term variability plays an important role. EMU1 is positive and signiﬁcant, indicating no FDI
diversion following the introduction of the euro and corroborating the intuition about deep
integration. The inclusion of this additional control sensibly increases both the marginal eﬀects
of CU and its t-statistics, while it has a limited eﬀect on CV 3 and CV 10. Column (4) rises some
concern in that the inclusion of controls for exchange rate volatility not only lowers the marginal
eﬀect of the currency union dummy, but also sensibly aﬀect its signiﬁcance, thus instilling the
doubt whether using the same legal tender merely eliminates exchange rate volatility. When
EMU1 is introduced —as column (5) shows— CU regains both signiﬁcance and an appreciable
marginal eﬀect. Using real GDP yields basically the same results. The currency union dummy
in particular displays a fair degree of robustness to this change; marginal eﬀects tell that using
the same currency may increase cross border investment ﬂows by 50 to 170Tables 5 6 repeat
the exercise employing a diﬀerent measure of short-term volatility. The KR3 index, based on
the rate of change rather than on the level of bilateral exchange rates, is never signiﬁcant, while
the other controls do not suﬀer any deterioration. The currency union eﬀect is pretty robust
to diﬀerent speciﬁcations and always signiﬁcant at 1% level. This strengthen the impression
that what really matters are long term misalignments rather than short lived ﬂuctuations that
are more easily edged in ﬁnancial markets. A further check is performed using only 1990–2001
data, even though the shorter time span poses serious limitations to the time-series approach
of the paper. Results are presented in Tables 7 and 8: the main point to note here is the
loss of signiﬁcance of the exchange rate volatility indexes and of the currency union dummy
(except when EMU1 is also included), though all relevant variables display the expected sign
and marginal eﬀects have the same order of magnitude as before. Overall the robustness of
the results seems well established40. A potential problem plaguing this kind of studies is the
39FDI’s, on the contrary, are only taken in their real values.
40Yet another regression is run limiting the sample to industrial countries only: results —not presented in the
paper and available upon request— conﬁrm previous ﬁndings.
13presence of endogeneity between explanatory and dependent variables. If in fact FDI’s concur
to generate economic growth41, then a bias would aﬀect estimation results and the regressors
should be replaced by instruments. A straightforward instrument is lagged GDP: despite all the
thaumaturgic properties usually attached to FDI’s, it is in fact diﬃcult to maintain that they
can aﬀect past economic performance. Regression results (not reported) obtained with lagged
GDP show no qualitative change in the conclusions of the paper. Endogeneity thus seems neither
to play a relevant role, nor to introduce a signiﬁcant bias.
As anticipated before, the paper allows one to test the implication of the model presented
in Mody et al. (2003): in particular, one can test the hypothesis that joining a currency union
has an eﬀect comparable to an increase in host country transparency. If this is the case, then,
the ratio of FDI’s over trade should decrease because agent will substitute away from direct
ownership. Estimating equation 9 using a Tobit model yields the results presented in Tables 9
and 10. The currency union dummy is not signiﬁcant, but when EMU1 is introduced; in this
case, however, the eﬀect is positive contrary to expectations. The theoretical discussion of the
ﬁrst paragraphs did not take explicitly in consideration the impact of exchange rate volatility
on the choice between trade and direct investment. However, the option value paradigm can
still oﬀer a plausible explanation. Investing abroad, in fact, can legitimately be considered more
“irreversible” than investing at home, and hence uncertainty is more likely to aﬀect international
investment ﬂows rather than commercial links, even if one admits the possibility that, in order
to export, a ﬁrm has to increase its productive capacity and thus to incur in some sunk costs.
The proximity-concentration trade-oﬀ, the benchmark explanation for the choice between trade
and FDI, is consistent with this view: the duplication of activities associated with an FDI makes
this form of international transaction more costly than an increase in productive capacity aimed
at serving the foreign market. Hence, ceteris paribus, lower exchange rate uncertainty makes
FDI more competitive than before with respect to trade. Using real rather than nominal GDP
makes coeﬃcients more signiﬁcant, and marginal eﬀects larger.
The main concern with previous results is the presence of only three years in which the
currency union dummy equals 1. To alleviate this problem, the present paragraph investigates
whether participation in the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) yielded results comparable to
those of a currency union. If, in fact, the main mechanism through which a single currency aﬀects
international investment ﬂows is the reduction in exchange rate ﬂuctuations, then a good deal of
volatility had already been removed by ERM through the introduction of a narrow ﬂuctuation
band around a central parity. It is then possible to think about ERM as a “softer” version of
EMU that should still have some positive eﬀects on FDI’s. The main advantage of using ERM
is the amount of data available: created in 1979 to link the currencies of 8 countries, the system
lasted until the introduction of the euro in 1999 when it counted 13 members. Tensions on the
exchange rate markets lead to a famous crisis in September 1992, but the system was overall
successful. A similar mechanism —ERM2— is currently operating for countries that are not
yet part of EMU, though at the moment only Denmark has joined. Table 11 reports regression
results when a new indicator for ERM participation is included. ERMijt takes value 1 when
country i and country j are both part of the system at time t or when one country belongs to
EMU while the other to ERM2. The new dummy presents a slightly positive coeﬃcient that
is signiﬁcant at 5% level when controls are in real terms (columns 3 and 4), slightly below the
threshold value otherwise. Since Table 11 basically replicates columns (1) and (4) of Table 3 and
Table 4, a comparison with previous results is instructive and interesting. Leaving aside the more
traditional “gravity” variables that basically display no change, it is interesting to note how the
estimated coeﬃcient of the currency union dummy becomes both larger and more signiﬁcant,
while the exchange rate volatility indexes moves only slightly. Table 11 presents only mild
evidence of a small positive eﬀect of ERM on cross-border investments, whereas the introduction
41This is a much debated point: most recent empirical evidence, especially studies based on ﬁrm level data,
seems to reject this causation. See for instance Aitken and Harrison (1999).
14of a single currency spurred FDI ﬂows far more. This is consistent with irreversibility playing
an important role in investment decisions. While in fact ERM did not shield investors from
realignments and discrete jumps in the exchange rates, EMU not only eliminates volatility, but
assures permanent stability. By eliminating present and future uncertainty about exchange rate
ﬂuctuations a common currency is thus able to mitigate the impact of irreversibility far beyond
what a mere pegged rate can do. Estimated marginal eﬀects, in fact, imply that EMU has more
than doubled intra-European FDI ﬂows; on the other hand, the signiﬁcance of the coeﬃcient
suggests that eliminating exchange rate volatility is not the only channel through which EMU
aﬀects cross-border investments.
The last exercise presented here addresses whether countries that chose to opt-out of EMU
(Denmark, UK, Sweden) suﬀered a signiﬁcant FDI diversion due to their decision not to adopt
the single currency. To do this, the paper re-estimates the relevant equation without the currency
union dummy and then analyzes the residuals. Arguably, a negative impact of the decision to
opt-out should result in negative residuals or, to say it better, in the distribution of residuals
having more mass in the negative area. Figure 7 plots the distributions of estimated residuals
for the three aforementioned countries, EMU members and the rest of the world (RoW). The
column labeled EMU plots the distribution of estimated residuals relative to all the country
pairs for which CUt = 1 in at least once. Den, on the other hand, shows the residuals for all the
24 pairs involving Denmark: the same applies to Swe and UK, while RoW aggregates estimated
residuals for all other countries. Residuals are obtained from Tobit estimation of equation 8
using the full sample (1980–2001) and real GDP’s. Residuals obtained using nominal GDP’s
look very similar and are not reported. The ﬁgure shows that most of the probability mass
is concentrated around zero; the median of the distributions are reported in Table 12. Visual
inspection suggests that residuals related to EMU member countries have more probability mass
on the positive orthant, consistently with previous results that indicate a positive eﬀect of the
CU dummy. Somehow surprisingly, the median for the UK is just slightly smaller. Hence the UK
seems not to have suﬀered any FDI diversion after the introduction of the euro. Figure 2 restricts
the above investigation to those years (in the sample) for which EMU was actually implemented
(1999, 2000 and 2001). It is now more evident that EMU members display residuals larger that
other groups (luckily enough the median for RoW equals zero, thus facilitating comparisons):
the UK still displays a positive median as well as Denmark, while Sweden seems the only country
for which non-EMU status has had a negative impact on FDI ﬂows. With the help of a simple
non-parametric test (the sign-test) it is possible to investigate the hypothesis that the actual
median equals zero for all groups. Table 12 reports both a two-sided version of this test (where
the null hypothesis H0: median=0 is confronted with a general alternative H1: median¡0) and a
one-tailed version that speciﬁcally takes into consideration the alternative of a negative median
(H0: median=0 Vs H1: median¡0). To better understand Table 12, it is useful to start from
the residuals of EMU members: consistently with a positive median (otherwise there would be
no CU eﬀect), the null is rejected in a two-tailed test and accepted when the only alternative
is a negative value. The values taken by the residuals of pairs involving the UK display a very
similar pattern, thus indicating that the decision to opt out of the monetary union has not led
to any substantial FDI diversion. The picture is less clear cut for Denmark and Sweden. Here,
in fact, while the null is supported in both tests when the whole sample period is considered,
the result is reversed when the focus is restricted to 1999–2001. This suggests that residuals of
the two countries may in fact have a negative median, i.e. more probability mass concentrated
in the negative area. Overall, both visual inspection and the sign test indicate that refusing to
join the EMU has had a negative eﬀect on FDI ﬂows for Sweden (and less clearly Denmark),
while nothing of this sort has happened in the case of the UK42.
42Given the low power of the test, and the short length of time for which EMU data are available, caution
should be put in analyzing these data.
157 Conclusions
The paper has investigated the impact of currency unions on international direct investment ﬂows
employing a gravity model with a limited number of explanatory variables, time dummies and
country-pair ﬁxed eﬀects. Concentrating on the time-series variation in the data, the analysis
bypasses, at least partially, potential endogeneity issues, while time dummies should reduce the
noise in the data. Drawing from the option value approach to investment decisions, the paper
explains how a reduction in exchange rate uncertainty due to the introduction of a single currency
can spur cross-country investment ﬂows. Empirical analysis, conducted using a Tobit model,
supports the theoretical prediction but also suggests that elimination of exchange rate volatility
is not the only channel through which currency unions work. In fact, when an additional control
for ERM participation is introduced, the CU dummy retains a signiﬁcant positive eﬀect.
Further research is needed in this area aiming at extending the dataset in order to increase
the number of observations for which the currency union dummy is equal to 1 and, possibly, at
incorporating interest rate volatility into the picture. This is in fact another potential channel
through which a common currency can inﬂuence investment decisions. The short length of
time for which EMU data are available (1999–2001) suggests point estimates should not be
taken too seriously. The traditional high variability of FDI ﬂows, in fact, implies that the
three years for which the currency union dummy equals 1 may not be very informative, despite
time dummies should take care of idiosyncratic shocks. A second limitation of the dataset
consists in the inability to distinguish among short- and long-term eﬀects. Arguably, one could
conclude that the currency union eﬀects found in the paper are the one-time result of portfolio
reallocation by multinationals, so that in the longer-term FDI ﬂows will revert to their pre-shock
levels. Nonetheless, the sign and signiﬁcance of the CU coeﬃcient are quite robust to diﬀerent
speciﬁcations and support economic intuition. As a ﬁnal remark, it is worth noting that the
paper takes no stand on the issue of the impact of FDI ﬂows on economic performance. This
work in fact is not interested in the potential growth-enhancing eﬀect of currency unions (via
FDI’s), but is rather part of a broader research agenda that aims at unveiling the potential
endogenous mechanisms at work in a currency area.
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19Table 1: Expected Sign of Key Coeﬃcients
Equation LHS Variable Relevant RHS Variables Coeﬃcient Expected Sign
(6) lnFDIijt CUijt γ positive
CUijt γ positive
(7) lnFDIijt RERVt δ1 negative
MISt δ2 negative
CUijt γ positive
(8) lnFDIijt RERVt δ1 negative
MISt δ2 negative
EMU1ijt φ positive
(9) lnFDIijt/Tradeijt CUijt γ negative
Table 2: OLS Regression with Country-Pair and Year Fixed Eﬀects
Nominal GDP Real GDP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
GDP country1 0.87 0.77 0.85 0.58 0.56 0.56
(4.59)** (3.91)** (4.27)** (9.30)** (8.93)** (8.93)**
GDP country2 0.82 0.87 0.90 -0.07 -0.04 -0.01
(3.97)** (4.19)** (4.32)** (0.62) (0.33) (0.05)
Population country1 -13.31 -13.64 -13.16 -9.06 -9.41 -9.07
(15.66)** (15.93)** (15.26)** (9.13)** (9.38)** (9.02)**
Population country2 -1.84 -2.21 -1.89 -1.73 -2.12 -1.86
(1.60) (1.91) (1.63) (1.52) (1.85) (1.62)
CU 0.93 0.80 1.19 0.87 0.76 1.10
(6.16)** (5.00)** (6.38)** (5.82)** (4.83)** (5.99)**
CV3
a -1.76 -1.70 -2.23 -2.23
(2.25)* (2.18)* (2.91)** (2.92)**
CV10
b -0.96 -0.95 -0.67 -0.69
(1.20) (1.19) (0.85) (0.87)
EMU1 0.57 0.50
(4.04)** (3.56)**
Observations 3594 3528 3528 3594 3528 3528
CU members 110 110 110 110 110 110
Number of groups 280 280 280 280 280 280
R-squared 0.46 0.46 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.47
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses: * signiﬁcant a 5%; ** signiﬁcant at 10%
Year dummies and constant not reported
a 3 year coeﬃcient of variation of real exchange rate
b 10 year coeﬃcient of variation of real exchange rate
20Table 3: Tobit Model with Country-Pair and Year Fixed Eﬀects (1980–2001): Nominal GDP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Estimated Marginal Estimated Marginal Estimated Marginal Estimated Marginal Estimated Marginal
Coeﬃcient Eﬀect Coeﬃcient Eﬀect Coeﬃcient Eﬀect Coeﬃcient Eﬀect Coeﬃcient Eﬀect
GDP country1 0.98 0.76 0.57 0.43 0.69 0.54 0.46 0.34 0.58 0.45
(3.45) ** (1.93) (2.33)** (1.56) (1.97)*
GDP country2 0.98 0.76 0.94 0.71 0.97 0.76 0.86 0.64 0.88 0.68
(3.34) ** (3.19) ** (3.29) ** (2.90) ** (2.99) **
Population country1 -15.14 -11.73 -14.66 -11.11 -13.73 -10.82 -14.84 -10.99 -13.89 -10.76
(11.85)** (11.46)** (10.65)** (11.61)** (10.78)**
Population country2 -1.28 -0.99 -1.21 -0.92 -0.69 -0.54 -1.35 -1 -0.83 -0.65
(0.78) (0.74) (0.42) (0.83) (0.51)
CU 0.65 0.51 0.63 0.48 1.28 1.01 0.41 0.3 1.06 0.82
(2.86) ** (2.78) ** (4.85) ** (1.73) (3.88) **
CV3
a -2.89 -2.19 -2.77 -2.19 -2.53 -1.87 -2.43 -1.88
(2.53)** (2.43)** (2.20)* (2.12)*
CV10
b -3.45 -2.56 -3.34 -2.58
(2.96)** (2.87)**
EMU1 0.97 0.77 0.96 0.74
(4.82) ** (4.73)**
Observations 4698 4599 4599 4568 4568
of which censored 683 683 683 682 682
CU members 133 133 133 133 133
Log-L -8677.66 -8550.81 -8539.37 -8492.49 -8481.56
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses: * signiﬁcant a 5%; ** signiﬁcant at 10%
Year dummies and constant not reported
a 3 year coeﬃcient of variation of real exchange rate
b 10 year coeﬃcient of variation of real exchange rate
2
1Table 4: Tobit Model with Country-Pair and Year Fixed Eﬀects (1980–2001): Real GDP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Estimated Marginal Estimated Marginal Estimated Marginal Estimated Marginal Estimated Marginal
Coeﬃcient Eﬀect Coeﬃcient Eﬀect Coeﬃcient Eﬀect Coeﬃcient Eﬀect Coeﬃcient Eﬀect
GDP country1 0.41 0.3 0.5 0.38 0.5 0.39 0.46 0.34 0.46 0.35
(4.30) ** (5.26) ** (5.25)** (4.77) ** (4.78)**
GDP country2 -0.11 -0.08 -0.06 -0.05 -0.02 -0.01 -0.08 -0.06 -0.04 -0.03
(0.76) (0.44) (0.13) (0.57) (0.26)
Population country1 -12.99 -9.59 -11.24 -8.56 -10.51 -8.26 -11.64 -8.71 -10.88 -8.43
(8.95)** (7.69)** (7.16)** (7.95)** (7.40)**
Population country2 -1.61 -1.19 -1.39 -1.05 -0.9 -0.7 -1.52 -1.13 -1.02 -0.79
(0.99) (0.85) (0.55) (0.93) (0.63)
CU 0.58 0.43 0.6 0.45 1.2 0.94 0.39 0.3 1 0.78
(2.55) ** (2.63) ** (4.58) ** (1.68) (3.71) **
CV3
a -3.22 -2.45 -3.2 -2.51 -2.81 -2.1 -2.8 -2.17
(2.86)** (2.85)** (2.47)** (2.47)**
CV10
b -3.22 -2.41 -3.15 -2.44
(2.77)** (2.72)**
EMU1 0.92 0.72 0.92 0.71
(4.57) ** (4.53)**
Observations 4698 4599 4599 4568 4568
of which censored 683 683 683 682 682
CU members 133 133 133 133 133
Log-L -8679.37 -8543.89 -8533.64 -8486.5 -8476.51
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses: * signiﬁcant a 5%; ** signiﬁcant at 10%
Year dummies and constant not reported
a 3 year coeﬃcient of variation of real exchange rate
b 10 year coeﬃcient of variation of real exchange rate
2
2Table 5: Tobit Model Using the KR Volatility Index: Nominal GDP
(1) (2) (3)
Estimated Marginal Estimated Marginal Estimated Marginal
Coeﬃcient Eﬀect Coeﬃcient Eﬀect Coeﬃcient Eﬀect
GDP country1 0.69 0.53 0.80 0.64 0.66 0.51
(2.38)** (2.76) ** (2.24)*
GDP country2 0.97 0.75 0.99 0.79 0.90 0.70
(3.29) ** (3.38) ** (3.03) **
Population country1 -14.41 -11.07 -13.47 -10.76 -13.69 -10.70
(11.29)** (10.48)** (10.65)**
Population country2 -1.01 -0.78 -0.50 -0.40 -0.73 -0.57
(0.62) (0.31) (0.45)
CU 0.71 0.55 1.36 1.09 1.1 0.86
(3.14) ** (5.19) ** (4.06) **
KR3





EMU1 0.98 0.78 0.97 0.76
(4.87)** (4.78) **
Observations 4599 4599 4568
of which censored 683 683 682
CU members 133 133 133
Log-L -8553.92 -8542.28 -8483.51
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses: * signiﬁcant a 5%; ** signiﬁcant at 10%
Year dummies and constant not reported
a Volatility measured proposed in Kenen and Rodrick (1986); see page 9 above for an exact deﬁnition
b 10 year coeﬃcient of variation of real exchange rate
2
3Table 6: Tobit Model Using the KR Volatility Index: Real GDP
(1) (2) (3)
Estimated Marginal Estimated Marginal Estimated Marginal
Coeﬃcient Eﬀect Coeﬃcient Eﬀect Coeﬃcient Eﬀect
GDP country1 0.51 0.39 0.50 0.40 0.46 0.36
(5.30) ** (5.30)** (4.81) **
GDP country2 -0.09 -0.07 -0.04 -0.03 -0.05 -0.04
(0.59) (0.27) (0.34)
Population country1 -11.02 -8.45 -10.28 -8.13 -10.7 -8.33
(7.53)** (7.00)** (7.28)**
Population country2 -1.2 -0.92 -0.72 -0.57 -0.94 -0.73
(0.74) (0.44) (0.58)
CU 0.67 0.52 1.27 1.01 1.04 0.81
(2.99)** (4.90) ** (3.86) **




EMU1 0.92 0.73 0.92 0.72
(4.58)** (4.55)**
Observations 4599 4599 4568
of which censored 683 683 682
CU members 133 133 133
Log-L -8547.92 -8537.62 -8478.95
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses: * signiﬁcant a 5%; ** signiﬁcant at 10%
Year dummies and constant not reported
a Volatility measured proposed in Kenen and Rodrick (1986); see page 9 above for an exact deﬁnition
b 10 year coeﬃcient of variation of real exchange rate
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4Table 7: Tobit Model with Country-Pair and Year Fixed Eﬀects (1990–2001): Nominal GDP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Estimated Marginal Estimated Marginal Estimated Marginal Estimated Marginal Estimated Marginal
Coeﬃcient Eﬀect Coeﬃcient Eﬀect Coeﬃcient Eﬀect Coeﬃcient Eﬀect Coeﬃcient Eﬀect
GDP country1 1.35 1.08 0.41 0.34 0.66 0.56 0.39 0.32 0.63 0.53
(3.14)** (0.86) (1.37) (0.82) (1.31)
GDP country2 1.09 0.88 0.99 0.83 1.05 0.89 0.91 0.74 0.96 0.81
(2.44)** (2.15)* (2.29)* (1.96)* (2.09)*
Population country1 -15.67 -12.55 -9.13 -7.62 -7.76 -6.64 -10.97 -8.96 -9.38 -7.89
(5.15)** (2.78)** (2.36)** (3.27)** (2.78)**
Population country2 -10.70 -8.56 -9.84 -8.22 -8.89 -7.61 -10.54 -8.61 -9.49 -7.98
(3.18)** (2.85)** (2.58)** (3.03)** (2.73)**
CU 0.38 0.30 0.40 0.34 1.04 0.89 0.22 0.18 0.87 0.73
(1.46) (1.56) (3.49)** (0.79) (2.74)**
CV3
a -1.22 -1.02 -1.18 -1.01 -0.75 -0.62 -0.79 -0.66
(0.71) (0.69) (0.44) (0.46)
CV10
b -2.44 -2.00 -2.11 -1.78
(1.52) (1.32)
EMU1 0.96 0.82 0.94 0.79
(4.23)** (4.11)**
Observations 3132 3042 3042 3011 3011
of which censored 495 495 495 494 494
CU members 133 133 133 133 133
Log-L -5810.92 -5699.69 -5690.91 -5643.57 -5635.36
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses: * signiﬁcant a 5%; ** signiﬁcant at 10%
Year dummies and constant not reported
a 3 year coeﬃcient of variation of real exchange rate
b 10 year coeﬃcient of variation of real exchange rate
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5Table 8: Tobit Model with Country-Pair and Year Fixed Eﬀects (1990–2001): Real GDP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Estimated Marginal Estimated Marginal Estimated Marginal Estimated Marginal Estimated Marginal
Coeﬃcient Eﬀect Coeﬃcient Eﬀect Coeﬃcient Eﬀect Coeﬃcient Eﬀect Coeﬃcient Eﬀect
GDP country1 0.17 0.13 0.45 0.38 0.36 0.31 0.51 0.42 0.41 0.35
(0.54) (1.46) (1.16) (1.62) (1.31)
GDP country2 -0.4 -0.32 -0.39 -0.33 -0.25 -0.21 -0.32 -0.26 -0.18 -0.16
(1.12) (1.09) (0.68) (0.87) (0.5)
Population country1 -15.09 -12.04 -9.11 -7.68 -7.44 -6.38 -11.25 -9.25 -9.39 -7.9
(4.92)** (2.84)** (2.30)** (3.40)** (2.82)**
Population country2 -7.67 -6.12 -6.59 -5.55 -6.01 -5.16 -7.79 -6.4 -7.1 -5.97
(2.25)* (1.90) (1.74) (2.21)* (2.02)*
CU 0.23 0.18 0.31 0.26 0.88 0.76 0.10 0.08 0.68 0.57
(0.90) (1.20) (2.97) ** (0.36) (2.16) *
CV3
a -1.57 -1.32 -1.73 -1.49 -0.96 -0.79 -1.18 -1
(0.94) (1.04) (0.56) (0.70)
CV10
b -2.92 -2.4 -2.69 -2.26
(1.79) (1.65)
EMU1 0.87 0.75 0.86 0.72
(3.84) ** (3.74)**
Observations 3132 3042 3042 3011 3011
of which censored 495 495 495 494 494
CU members 133 133 133 133 133
Log-L -5817.62 -5700.56 -5693.31 -5643.97 -5637.17
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses: * signiﬁcant a 5%; ** signiﬁcant at 10%
Year dummies and constant not reported
a 3 year coeﬃcient of variation of real exchange rate
b 10 year coeﬃcient of variation of real exchange rate
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6Table 9: FDI/Trade: Tobit Model with Country-Pair and Year Fixed Eﬀects: Nominal GDP
(1) (2) (3)
Estimated Marginal Estimated Marginal Estimated Marginal
Coeﬃcient Eﬀect Coeﬃcient Eﬀect Coeﬃcient Eﬀect
GDP country1 0.25 0.09 0.22 0.06 0.24 0.08
(4.98)** (4.18)** (4.63)**
GDP country2 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.01
(0.96) (0.49) (0.58)
Population country1 -3.65 -1.31 -3.75 -1.08 -3.58 -1.17
(16.28)** (16.71)** (15.78)**
Population country2 0.34 0.12 0.25 0.07 0.35 0.12
(1.19) (0.88) (1.23)
CU 0.07 0.03 -0.01 0.00 0.12 0.04
(1.76) (0.13) (2.46)**
CV3
a -0.32 -0.09 -0.30 -0.10
(1.56) (1.47)
CV10




Observations 4640 4568 4639
of which censored 683 682 682
CU members 133 133 133
Log-L -1986.76 -1961.33 -1950.14
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses: * signiﬁcant a 5%; ** signiﬁcant at 10%
Year dummies and constant not reported
a 3 year coeﬃcient of variation of real exchange rate
b 10 year coeﬃcient of variation of real exchange rate
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7Table 10: FDI/Trade: Tobit Model with Country-Pair and Year Fixed Eﬀects: Real GDP
(1) (2) (3)
Estimated Marginal Estimated Marginal Estimated Marginal
Coeﬃcient Eﬀect Coeﬃcient Eﬀect Coeﬃcient Eﬀect
GDP country1 0.34 0.21 0.33 0.20 0.33 0.21
(21.57)** (21.02)** (21.07)**
GDP country2 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.02
(0.78) (0.89) (1.23)
Population country1 -1.10 -0.69 -1.22 -0.74 -1.09 -0.69
(4.54)** (5.02)** (4.45)**
Population country2 0.51 0.32 0.43 0.26 0.52 0.33
(1.86) (1.57) (1.92)
CU 0.06 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.12 0.08
(1.56) (0.28) (2.71)**
CV3
a -0.45 -0.27 -0.46 -0.29
(2.39)** (2.40)**
CV10




Observations 4640 4639 4639
of which censored 683 682 682
CU members 133 133 133
Log-L -1812.07 -1794.05 -1784.06
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses: * signiﬁcant a 5%; ** signiﬁcant at 10%
Year dummies and constant not reported
a 3 year coeﬃcient of variation of real exchange rate
b 10 year coeﬃcient of variation of real exchange rate
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8Table 11: Tobit Model with ERM dummy (1980–2001)
Nominal GDP Real GDP
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Estimated Marginal Estimated Marginal Estimated Marginal Estimated Marginal
Coeﬃcient Eﬀect Coeﬃcient Eﬀect Coeﬃcient Eﬀect Coeﬃcient Eﬀect
GDP country1 0.96 0.75 0.44 0.33 0.41 0.30 0.45 0.35
(3.40)** (1.51) (4.27)** (4.73)**
GDP country2 0.93 0.73 0.80 0.60 -0.11 -0.08 -0.08 -0.06
(3.15)** (2.69)** (0.73) (0.55)
Population country1 -15.01 -11.74 -14.66 -11.02 -12.83 -9.64 -11.45 -8.74
(11.72)** (11.45)** (8.83)** (7.80)**
Population country2 -0.95 -0.74 -0.98 -0.74 -1.19 -0.90 -1.07 -0.81
(0.58) (0.60) (0.73) (0.65)
CU 0.85 0.66 0.62 0.46 0.81 0.61 0.63 0.48
(3.34)** (2.37)** (3.21)** (2.43)**
ERM 0.33 0.25 0.35 0.26 0.39 0.29 0.39 0.30
(1.74) (1.89) (2.08)* (2.14)*
CV3
a -2.35 -1.77 -2.60 -1.98
(2.04)* (2.28)*
CV10
b -3.58 -2.69 -3.35 -2.55
(3.07)** (2.88)**
Observations 4698 4568 4698 4568
of which censored 683 682 683 682
CU members 133 133 133 133
Log-L -8676.15 -8490.73 -8677.20 -8484.24
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses: * signiﬁcant a 5%; ** signiﬁcant at 10%
Year dummies and constant not reported
a 3 year coeﬃcient of variation of real exchange rate
b 10 year coeﬃcient of variation of real exchange rate
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9Table 12: Median of Estimated Residuals from Tobit Regression without the CU dummy
RoW EMU Denmark Sweden UK
Median 0.12 0.89 -0.04 0.11 0.87
All Years Two-Sided Sign test
a 0.08 0 0.42 0.73 0
One-Sided Sign Test
b 0.96 1 0.96 0.67 1
Median 0 1.81 0.69 -0.45 1.02
Years: 1999-2001 Two-Sided Sign test
a 0.57 0.01 0.12 0.4 0.4
One-Sided Sign Test
b 0.28 1 0.21 0.2 0.86
Residuals obtained from Tobit estimation of equation (8)
The table reports the probabilities of H0
a H0: median= 0 vs H1: median6= 0
b H0: median= 0 vs H1: median< 0
3




















Residuals from Tobit estimation of equation (8) without the CU dummy.
31